Friday, September 29, 2006

Gilles Deleuze on Foucault on Unicorns

A proposition is supposed to have a refferent. That is to say that while reference or intentionality is intrinsic and constant in propositions, whatever fulfils that purpose is extrinsic and variable. But this is not the case with statements: a statement has a 'discursive object' which does not derive in any sense from a particular state of things, but stems from the statement itself. It is a derived object, defined precisely by the limits to the lines of variation of the statement existing as a primitive function. As a result there is no point in distinguishing between the different types of intentionality; some could be furnished byt the condition of things, while others would remain empty and offer instead an example of generally fictive or imaginary states (I met a unicorn) or even generally absurd ones (a squared circle).

Falling of my chair laughing at the laundromat led me to what will be my next post on personal pronoun play in my paintings.


heather said...

i'll referent you right in the discursives if you keep this up.

Wil Murray said...

Funny you should reading Deleuze feels more like some experiment in getting hypnotized by Deleuze than seeking some better understanding of what he's on about. I make occasional expeditions into his books that just scramble up my head.
That said, a voice sometimes pops up in my head that says "You could just as much beat yourself in the crotch with this book until sterile as read it". I don't think Gilles would be disappointed with that type of reading, either.
Like learning about squirrel behaviour by sticking one in your pants.
...but then I imagine him sitting there, searching for an example of "imaginary" and writing the line about unicorns and I laugh my ass off(keep in mind I'd read 30 pages of the type of language preceeding that line).

heather said...

unicorns aren't even imaginary. they're magical. there's a difference.
so stick that in your 'discursive object' and smoke it.